PUF-AES-PUF: a novel PUF architecture against non-invasive attacks by Yu, Weize & Chen, Jia
PUF-AES-PUF: a novel PUF architecture
against non-invasive attacks
Weize Yu and Jia Chen
In this letter, a physical unclonable function (PUF)-advanced
encryption standard (AES)-PUF is proposed as a new PUF architecture
by embedding an AES cryptographic circuit between two conventional
PUF circuits to conceal their challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs) against
machine learning attacks. Moreover, an internal confidential data is
added to the secret key of the AES cryptographic circuit in the new PUF
architecture to update the secret key in real-time against side-channel
attacks. As shown in the results, even if 1 million number of data are
enabled by the adversary to implement machine learning or side-channel
attacks, the proposed PUF can not be cracked. By contrast, only 5,000
(1,000) number of data are sufficient to leak the confidential information
of a conventional PUF via machine learning (side-channel) attacks.
Introduction: In the field of cybersecurity, silicon physical unclonable
functions (PUFs) are well known hardware security primitives which are
applied in, for example, generating secret keys, executing authentications,
and devising wireless sensors [1]. The basic mechanism of a silicon PUF
is to exploit the intrinsic physical randomness of identically designed
integrated circuit (IC) components induced by the fabrication process to
establish a unique mapping between the input challenges and the output
responses (i.e., the challenge-to-response pairs (CRPs)).
Although the present silicon PUFs may be effective for protecting
the IoT against some specific malicious attacks, like hardware reverse
engineering attacks, one of the most significant security concerns is their
robustness against machine learning attacks [2]. High linear relationships
exist between the CRPs for most conventional silicon PUFs, such as ring-
oscillator (RO) PUFs [3] and arbiter PUFs [3], which cause them to be
extremely vulnerable to machine learning. All the improving techniques
[2, 3, 4] to combat machine learning attacks are focused on increasing the
degree of non-linearity between the CRPs. Unfortunately, the high degree
of non-linearity may undermine the performance of silicon PUFs [2,
4]. Furthermore, improving the degree of non-linearity of silicon PUFs
only hinders the execution of machine learning attacks; it is incapable of
thoroughly eliminating the threat of such attacks.
Side-channel attacks are a type of powerful non-invasive attacks that
can be utilized by the adversary to leak the confidential information of
modern ICs through exploring the correlation between the processed
data and the physical leakages (i.e., power dissipation, electromagnetic
(EM) emission, temperature, and timing) of the modern IC [5]. Advanced
encryption standard (AES) is a modern cryptographic algorithm that
contains a stored secret key and is widely used to encrypt confidential
data [5]. It is well-known that the secret key of an unprotected AES
cryptographic circuit can be disclosed without much effort if side-channel
attacks are implemented. In order to secure an AES cryptographic circuit
against side-channel attacks, all the existing countermeasures such as
masking [5] and hiding [6, 7] are trying to break the aforementioned
correlation between the processed data and the physical leakages.
Unfortunately, these existing countermeasures [5, 6, 7] are not adequately
secure and cause significant power/area/performance overhead to the
AES circuit.
In this letter, a novel and innovative PUF: key-updating (KU) AES-
embedded PUF is devised against both machine learning and side-
channel attacks, without increasing the degree of non-linearity between
the CRPs and without using the existing countermeasures.
Working principle of the proposed PUF: Fig. 1(a) shows a diagram of
a conventional PUF chip under machine learning attacks. Since both
the input challenge C1 and the output response R1 are exposed to the
adversary directly, the PUF chip-1 can be cracked by machine learning
attacks through training a reasonable number of CRPs. If we explore
the design by connecting a conventional PUF circuit in series with an
AES circuit to build a new PUF: hybrid PUF, as shown in Fig. 1(b),
the adversary may not be able to unriddle the secret information of the
conventional PUF via machine learning attacks directly. However, the
hybrid PUF in Fig. 1(b) is not sufficiently secure. The primary reason is
that the output data R2 of the AES is exposed to the adversary, therefore,
the secret keyKc of the AES may be leaked to the adversary by analyzing
the correlation between the output data R2 and a certain physical leakage
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Fig. 1 Three different PUF chips under machine learning or side-channel
attacks. (a) Conventional PUF (PUF chip-1). (b) Hybrid PUF (PUF chip-2).
(c) Key-updating (KU) AES-embedded PUF (PUF chip-3).
(a) (b)
14 nm 130 nm
Fig. 2 Performance evaluation for the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF. (a)
Uniqueness U and randomness R versus technology node Lg . (b) Reliability
G versus supply voltage Vdd and ambient temperature Ta (Lg = 130 nm).
of the PUF chip-2 if a side-channel attack is executed. Once the secret
key Kc of the AES is leaked, the output response R1 of the conventional
PUF will also be disclosed. As a result, the conventional PUF in Fig. 1(b)
can be uncovered by training the (C1, R1) pairs with machine learning
attacks ultimately.
So as to eliminate the threats from both side-channel and machine
learning attacks, a KU AES-embedded PUF is proposed as shown
in Fig. 1(c). The novel and innovative PUF architecture is secure against
machine learning attacks, without increasing the degree of nonlinearity
between the CRPs. As indicated in Fig. 1(c), an AES circuit is embedded
between two conventional PUF circuits and the output response R1 of
the PUF #1 circuit is encrypted by the AES circuit to provide the input
challenge R2 to the PUF #2 circuit. Since the output response R1 of the
PUF #1 and the input challenge R2 of the PUF #2 are concealed, the
adversary is incapable of performing machine learning attacks on either
of the two PUF circuits.
Another novel innovation is proposed to eliminate the threat of
side-channel attacks, which does not rely on any of the existing
countermeasures. It is proposed to add a real-time key-updating function
to the architecture that combines the output response R1 of the PUF #1
with the stored secret key Kc of the AES to create the actual key Kac
used by the AES circuit (Kac =R1 ⊕Kc). This is illustrated in Fig. 1(c).
Since the input data R1 and the output data R2 of the AES are unknown
to the adversary and the actual secret key Kac of the AES is updating
in real-time, the adversary is unable to execute side-channel attacks to
discover the stored secret key Kc.
Performance evaluation: Commonly, uniqueness, randomness, and
reliability are the three most significant parameters for assessing the
performance of a designed PUF [1]. To evaluate the performance of
the proposed PUF, A 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF is designed and
simulated in Cadence software. The designed PUF consists of two 128-
bit arbiter PUF circuits (PUF #1 and PUF #2) and a 128-bit AES
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Fig. 3 Simulations of power attacks (hamming-weight (HW) model is used).
(a) Absolute value of correlation coefficient (AVCC) versus possible keys for
leaking an 8-bit sub-key of the 128-bit unprotected AES cryptographic circuit
after inputting 1,000 number of data. (b) AVCC versus possible keys for
leaking an 8-bit sub-key of the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF after inputting
1 million number of data.
cryptographic circuit. Moreover, Monte Carlo simulations are executed
on the designed PUF in Cadence to emulate the random fabrication
process. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the uniqueness U is improved from 52.4%
to 50.4% if the CMOS technology node Lg is scaled from 130 nm to 14
nm; while the randomnessR improves from 47.1% to 49.5%. In addition,
Fig. 2(b) shows the worst reliability of the embedded PUF is about 97.4%
when the supply voltage is 1.0 V. The simulation results manifest the
proposed PUF has excellent uniqueness, randomness, and reliability.
Resilience against side-channel attacks: For the KU AES-embedded
PUF we propose, the input data R1 and output data R2 of the AES in
Fig. 1(c) are unknown to the adversary. As a result, to implement side-
channel attacks on the KU AES-embedded PUF, the adversary can only
analyze the correlation between the input challenge C1/output response
R3 in Fig. 1(c) and the physical leakages of the PUF chip.
Power attacks [6, 7] are a kind of side-channel attacks that are widely
used by the adversary to disclose the secret key of a cryptographic circuit
through monitoring the correlation between the processed data and the
power dissipation of the cryptographic circuit. The results of simulated
power attacks are shown in Fig. 3 for (a) a 128-bit unprotected AES
cryptographic circuit and (b) the 128-bit KU AES-embedded PUF. As
shown in Fig. 3(a), the 8-bit secret sub-key 96 of the unprotected AES
circuit is disclosed after inputting 1,000 plaintexts of data. However, for
the AES-embedded PUF, the secret sub-key 96 is masked from being
leaked to the adversary even if 1 million plaintexts are enabled, as shown
in Fig. 3(b). In addition, the absolute value of correlation coefficient
(AVCC) of the correct key 96 in Fig. 3(b) is two orders of magnitude
lower than the AVCC of the correct key 96 in Fig. 3(a). The primary
reason is that the actual secret key in the embedded PUF is updating in
real-time which greatly weakens the correlation between the processed
data and the power dissipation against power attacks.
Robustness against machine learning attacks: Linear regression (LR)
[3] and kernel support vector machine (SVM) [2] are two commonly
used machine learning algorithms to estimate the relationship between
the CRPs of a PUF.
Assume the input data of an IC is an n-bit binary data X =
(x1, x2, ..., xn)2 and the corresponding output data of the IC is an m-
bit binary data Y = (y1, y2, ..., ym)2. If an LR algorithm is selected for
executing a machine learning attack on the IC to model the 1st bit y1
of the output data Y , the relationship between the input data X and the
predicted output bit y∗1 can be denoted as
y∗1 =
n∑
i=1
aixi + a0 (1)
where a0, a1, ..., an are the linear coefficients of the LR algorithm.
If k number of input and output data pairs: (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), ...,
(Xk, Yk) are used as the training data sets, the cost function F (a) of the
LR algorithm and the coefficient ai, (i= 1, 2, ..., n) under the gradient
descend training can, respectively, be written as
F (a) =
1
2k
k∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
aixi,j + a0 − y1,j)2, (2)
ai := ai − β ∂F (a)
∂ai
= ai − 2β(
n∑
i=1
xi,j)F (a) (3)
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Fig. 4 Prediction accuracy r versus number of training CRPs N for the 1st
output bit of the three simulated circuits (designed with the 130 nm CMOS
technology) : the 128-bit arbiter PUF, the 128-bit AES, and the 128-bit
proposed PUF under machine learning attacks.
where β is the learning rate of the LR algorithm and xi,j (y1,j) is the ith
(1st) bit of the jth, (j = 1, 2, ..., k) input (output) data Xj (Yj).
By contrast, if a kernel SVM algorithm is applied to study a machine
learning attack on the IC, the classification function GSVM (X′) is
GSVM (X
′) = sign(
k∑
j=1
αjYjK(Xj , X
′) + b) (4)
where αj is the jth support variable and b is the optimal bias .K(Xj , X′)
denotes a Gauss kernel function whose bandwidth parameters are set as
the median of the corresponding Euclidean distances.
When the LR algorithm is used to train the CRPs of a 128-bit
simulated arbiter PUF circuit, as shown in Fig. 4, the 1st output bit of the
128-bit arbiter PUF circuit is cracked by the LR algorithm after training
about 5× 103 number of CRPs. By contrast, when the LR algorithm is
implemented on the 128-bit simulated AES cryptographic circuit, it fails
to predict the output bit even if 1× 106 number of CRPs are enabled for
training. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4, if a more advanced algorithm:
kernel SVM is selected for studying a machine learning attack, both the
AES cryptographic circuit and the proposed PUF circuit are able to resist
the kernel SVM. That indicates AES and AES-embedded circuits are
robust against the common machine learning attacks.
Conclusion: A novel PUF-AES-PUF architecture in conjunction with
a key-updating technique is utilized to design a state-of-the-art PUF
primitive that is able to resist non-invasive attacks. The proposed PUF
not only has excellent uniqueness (52.4%), randomness (47.1%), and
reliability (97.4%) but also maintains a high security level (>1 million
data) against both side-channel and machine learning attacks.
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